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SYMPOSIUM ARTICLES

Dred Scott's Daughters:
Nineteenth Century Urban Girls
at the Intersection of
Race and Patriarchy
BARBARA BENNETT WOODHOUSEt
"[Dred Scott's daughters] were virtually free before, having
achieved their freedom by their heels, what the more conscientious
Dred could not secure by ten years of litigation."'
LOOKING FOR CHILDREN'S STORIES IN HISTORIES WRITTEN BY
AND FOR ADULTS

Minors, male and female, are virtually invisible to
history. Their names are rarely known, their stories are
rarely told, and their perspectives are rarely explored. Yet a
closer examination of the experiences of children and
youths caught up in the great struggles of our past, and a
new

exploration

perspective,

is

of

history

essential

to

from

defining

a

child-centered

and

addressing

t Professor of Law and Co-Director of the Center for Children's Policy
Practice and Research at the University of Pennsylvania. Special thanks to the
many colleagues, especially Susan Vivian Mangold, Emily Buss, Robert
Schwartz, Sarah Barringer Gordon, Regina Austin, and Anne Kringel, who read
and commented on this piece. I also owe a debt to two gifted librarians at Biddle
Law Library-Ed Greenlee and Heidi Heller-whose insights and assistance
were invaluable.
1. Dred Scott Free at Last: Himself and His Family Emancipated,ST. LOUIS
DAILY EvENING NEWS, May 26, 1857, at 2 [hereinafter Dred Scott Free at Last].
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contemporary injustices towards children. One step in this
project is to uncover children's hidden legal histories. One
can find such stories lurking between the lines in the
biographies and autobiographies of famous adults. And one
can find them hiding in case law and documentary
collections. While the child's story is sometimes imperfectly
recalled, dimly reflected, or altered to fit others' agendas,
these sources are nevertheless a valuable starting point for
exploring children's legal history. By concentrating on the
children in these stories, we expose the ways in which
minority (the unexamined category) intersects with race,
gender, and class to define and confine their lives. This is
especially the case with female children whose agency is
even more hidden from view than that of their male
counterparts.
Modem scholars, seeking to explore the interlocking
roles of seemingly separate aspects of identity and status,
are rapidly building a more complex and nuanced American
history. Old studies are being re-examined to expose hidden
stories that were omitted, misunderstood, or willfully
distorted in earlier tellings and re-tellings. Prodded by a
new field of study called "intersectionality," historians have
begun to explore the ramifications of recognizing that
history was created and experienced by all kinds of people,
and that history can be and has been written from many
perspectives. Having long taken for granted the practice of
focusing on the stories of famous white men (an
intersectionality heretofore invisible because it was treated
as the unstated "norm"), historians are now delving into the
histories of African males, Asian females, white women who
worked in factories, and Black women who worked on
plantations. Legal historians and legal scholars who study
the meaning of the narratives in court cases, the basic
building blocks of law, have been in the forefront of this
movement, examining the process of law-making and its
human impact from previously unexamined points of view.?
2. See Kimberle Crenshaw, Mapping the Margins:Intersectionality,Identity
Politics, and Violence Against Women of Color, 43 STAN. L. REV. 1241 (1991);
Jerome McCristal Culp, Jr., Colorblind Remedies and the Intersectionalityof
Oppression: Policy Arguments Masqueradingas Moral Claims, 69 N.Y.U. L.
REV. 162 (1994); Laura E. Gomez, Constructing Latinalo Identities, 19
CIcANO-LATINo L. REV. 187 (1998); Angela P. Harris, Race and Essentialism in
Feminist Legal Theory, 42 STAN L. REv. 581 (1990); Cheryl I. Harris, Finding
Sojourner's Truth: Race, Gender, and the Institution of Property, 18 CARDOZO L.
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Intersectionality is simply the term used for the study
of social phenomena from intersecting perspectives,
accomplished by looking at the experiences of people who
live at the intersections of culturally constructed categories
like race, gender, and class. To some degree, childhood is a
cultural construct. The realities of children's lives are
shaped by, yet often defy, our descriptions of them. The
same techniques used by those who study the intersections
of race, gender, and class can shed light on the experiences
of children and challenge the inevitability of their
subordination by law.
As one scholar has observed,
[flor years, historians treated slaves as objects of white action
rather than as subjects in their own right, and largely ignored the
behavior and beliefs of the slaves themselves. Reacting against
this emphasis, many scholars have more recently focused on the
slaves as actors, stressing the world they made for
themselves
3
rather than the constraints imposed by their owners.

Scholars of childhood understand and have shown that
children are not passive objects, but rather operate as
active agents in shaping their own environment and their
own and others' destinies. Although my subject in these
pages is "urban girls," I will begin by examining the story of
an urban boy to illustrate how children's stories may be
obscured from view by the lives of famous men and women.
I found my protagonist, Fred Bailey, hiding in plain sight,
between the lines of a famous man's autobiography.4 Fred
Bailey was born to a slave mother in Eastern Shore
Maryland in 1818, and raised in the City of Baltimore. He
grew up to become the famous abolitionist orator and

REv. 309 (1996); Darren Lenard Hutchinson, "Gay Rights" for "Gay Whites"?:
Race, Sexual Identity, and EqualProtectionDiscourse, 85 CORNELL L. REV. 1358
(2000); Darren Lenard Hutchinson, Out Yet Unseen: A Racial Critique of Gay
and Lesbian Legal Theory and PoliticalDiscourse, 29 CoNN. L. REv. 561 (1997);
Dorothy E. Roberts, PunishingDrug Addicts Who Have Babies: Women of Color,
Equality, and the Right of Privacy, 104 HARV. L. REV. 1419 (1991); Darren
Rosenblum, Queer Intersectionalityand the Failure of Recent Lesbian and Gay
"Victories," 4 LAw AND SEX. 83 (1994).
3. PETER KOLCIN, AMERICAN SLAVERY: 1619-1877, at x (Eric Foner ed.,

1993).
4. See generally Frederick Douglass, Narrative of the Life of Frederick
Douglass, an American Slave, reprintedin THE CLASsIc SLAVE NARRATIVES 255
(Henry Louis Gates, Jr. ed., 1987).
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author, Frederick Douglass. In the eyes of the law, young
Fred suffered double disabilities as both a slave and a
minor. Fred felt these double disabilities keenly. Yet we
have been blinded to the implications of his minority by
history's spotlight on his enslavement and escape from
slavery. Frederick Douglass, the man, has claimed his place
in history after generations in undeserved obscurity. I
contend that it is time for Fred Bailey, the boy, to claim his
place as well.
THE INTERSECTIONS OF MINORITY, RACE AND CLASS:
CHILDREN IN SLAVERY AND SERVITUDE

Often, several identities overlap in a single human
being. Race and age both played integral roles in shaping
Fred Bailey's perceptions and in guiding his struggles
against injustice. Though born on a rural plantation, Fred
came of intellectual age as an urban child-the household
slave of the Hugh Auld family in the Fells Point section of
Baltimore. In many ways, despite his precocious intellect
and his legal status as a slave, Fred Bailey's life was no
different than that of the "ragtag band" of boys who were
his Baltimore playmates in the alleys around Durgin &
Bailey's Shipyard. All worked as well as played, and many
of them were indentured servants or apprentices, living in
the homes of their masters, and separated from their
families of origin. Unlike these white children, however,
Fred was forbidden to attend school-yet he learned to read
and write, becoming a skilled orator and famous author.
He first learned his letters from his mistress Sophia
Auld, who taught him from the family Bible. These lessons
ended abruptly, with an angry lecture from Master Hugh
on the importance of keeping slaves in ignorance in order to
maintain their inferiority and keep them meek. The lecture
made an indelible impression:
"Anigger should know nothing but to obey his master-to do as he
is told to do. Learning would spoil the best nigger in the world.
Now," said he, "if you teach that nigger (speaking of myself) how to
read, there would be no keeping him. It would forever unfit him to
be a slave." 5

5. Id. at 274.
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This furious outburst "sank deep into [Fred's] heart...
explain[ing] dark and mysterious 'things" which had
puzzled this highly intelligent child.' Finally, "the white
man's power to enslave the black man" had been revealed to
him, and he suddenly "understood the pathway from
slavery to freedom."7 By starving the Black child--denying
his natural hunger for learning-slavery sought ultimately
to dominate and diminish the Black man.
As Fred Bailey realized long before he became
Frederick Douglass, the lines between freedom and
bondage, and between persons and property, were patrolled
and reinforced by concepts of minority and dependency, as
well as by concepts of race and color. Douglass'
autobiography provides a vivid flash of insight. At one
point, the young boy is gazing longingly at ships sailing
north to freedom. He comforts himself by reflecting that it
is not race alone that defines his bondage: "I am but a boy,
and all boys are bound to some one." '
It was simply a fact of economic and social life that all
children were indeed '%ound" to somebody-legally under
some adult's custody and control. The United States was
settled in large part by working indentured children-many
of whom were bound out for long terms of service and
separated by an ocean from their parents. Historian Mary
Ann Mason notes that over half the people who settled the
Colonies south of New England came to America under
contracts of indenture, binding them in many cases past the
age of majority. Many were poor children taken from the
streets of English cities, often without consent. The average
age of an indentured servant was fourteen to sixteen, and
the youngest was six.' The United States Constitution
explicitly protected vested rights to the involuntary
servitude of children and youths, and of adults who had
been bound out or had bound themselves out as youths.
Article IV, Section 2, Clause 3, which formed the basis for
the Fugitive Slave Acts, covered all "[p]erson[s] held to
[slervice or [1labour" and obligated neighboring states to

6. Douglass, supra note 4, at 275.
7. Id.
8. Id. at 294.

9. MARY ANN MASON, FROM FATHER'S PROPERTY TO CHILDREN'S RIGHTS: THE
HISTORY OF CHILD CUSTODY IN THE UNITED STATES 2 (1994) (citing RICHARD B.
MORRIS, GOVERNMENT AND LABOR IN EARLY AMERICA 391 (1946)).
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return them if they escaped across state lines.'1
Bondage during minority was the norm. But bondage
for life? In his autobiography, the adult Douglass tells how
the child Fred Bailey struck up conversation with an Irish
seaman who was stunned and incredulous upon learning
that this small Black boy who seemed so bright and capable
was condemned to be a "slave for life." In Frederick's
retelling of the story, it did not appear to surprise the Irish
sailor that Fred was in bondage-it was the notion of
slavery for life which so horrified the Irishman and
continued to cause Fred such anguish." In Douglass' day,
adult control of children was virtually absolute, and it was
ordinary to treat a child as an economic commodity. Free
children belonged to their fathers, who had a right to their
labor in exchange for education and sustenance. Except for
those few children born into wealthy families, children
typically spent much of their youth working for others,
whether "rented out" by their fathers in exchange for
wages, bound out to employers in long-term indentures, or
apprenticed to a master to learn a trade.
Almost as draconian as racialized status were the
consequences for children of illegitimacy. In combination,
race, poverty, illegitimacy, and minority were used to
deprive parents of their children, and to deprive children of
many valuable rights. Again, Fred Bailey's story is
illustrative. Frederick Douglass conjectured that the owner
of Wye Plantation where he was born may have been his
father. By right, that gentleman's child should have been
among the lucky few children who lived a life of leisure and
learning. 2 Under the one drop rule, however, a child with a
drop of African blood was deemed Black. Deprived of his
father's wealth, Fred grew up poor, and because his father
did not (and legally could not) marry his mother, he was
illegitimate-all of which were interlocking and mutually
reinforcing disabilities.
Black children in antebellum America, in an exception
designed to perpetuate and reinforce racialized slavery and
to guarantee a renewable source of human capital, did not
take the status, free or slave, of their fathers. Instead, the
mother's status dictated that of her offspring. In every slave
10. U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 2, cl. 3.
11. See Douglass, supranote 4, at 280.
12. See id. at 255-57, 259-60.
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state, white men who fathered children with their female
slaves were able to "own" their children without having to
share their wealth or their homes with them. Another large
class of children, children born out of wedlock, were
stigmatized as bastards. Considered "filius nullius," or
children of no one, regardless of their color or class status,
they had no right to claim their fathers' names or
inheritance. Since legal marriage was denied to slaves, and
interracial marriage was a crime, mixed race children like
Fred were predestined to be either bastards or "chattels
personal" of their mother's owners.
Frederick Douglass' childhood illustrates the uncertain
existence of a "chattel." Deprived of his mother's care so she
could work in the fields, he was raised by his grandmother,
Betsy Bailey. When Fred was six, she was forced to take
him to the "big house" and leave him there. When he awoke
and found her gone, he was terrified and inconsolable. He
learned to survive without his beloved grandmother,
enduring beatings and hunger, but two years later he was
abruptly shipped to Baltimore to work for Hugh and Sophia
Auld."3 Transported at the whim of his owners from place to
place, and casually ripped from familiar surroundings and
people, Fred was a form of moveable personal possession,
with attributes both of thing and of human being, to be
used to satisfy the needs of his owners.'
The less economically valuable the child, the more
vulnerable the child was to abuse. The story of Fred's
disabled female cousin Henny is an example. Henny was
crippled as an infant and never was able to earn her keep,
let alone turn a profit. For her, the consequences of being a
chattel instead of a child were especially stark. Her
master's frustration at being saddled with a slave who
would forever be an economic liability seems to have
escalated into a pattern of vicious physical abuse. 5
Children of unmarried mothers, whatever their color or
13. See id. at 271.

14. See Kenneth M. Stampp, Chattels Personal, in AMERICAN

LAW AND THE

203 (Lawrence M. Friedman
& Harry N. Scheiber eds., 1988); see also Dorothy E. Roberts, The Genetic Tie,
62 U. CHi. L. REV. 209, 226 (1995) (stating that [u]nder the American
institution of slavery, then, [race] took on supreme importance. It determined
the most critical feature of the human condition-whether a child would be
deemed a free human being or chattel property").
15. See Douglass, supranote 4, at 288-89.
CONSTITUTIONAL ORDER: HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVES
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sex, were extremely vulnerable to being treated like chattel,
transferred to the most economical use, and separated from
their kin. 6 Even after unmarried mothers were given rights
of custody to their bastard children, poor laws patterned on
those of England continued to authorize local authorities to
remove any child lacking support, and to offer the child for
indenture as a servant or laborer until the age of majority. 7
Although single mothers were more likely to be destitute,
the laws applied to all families unable to care for their
young, and many children with two living, married parents
found themselves involuntarily indentured. Mulatto
children born to white mothers received still harsher
treatment,
which
was
intended
to
discourage
miscegenation. They were indentured at birth until they
reached age thirty-one. Indenture provided not only a
process of redistributing labor, but also a method of both
controlling unmarried and interracial sexual activity, and
privatizing responsibility for the poor, who would otherwise
be a drain on the community's resources.
Fred's work history in Fells Point illustrates that the
boundaries among the labor of free, indentured, and slave
children often blurred in practice. As both a young child
and adolescent, Fred worked and played side-by-side with
free Blacks and indentured whites. As a teenager, he was
trained in one of the shipbuilding trades in the same
shipyard as a gang of white a]prentices who reacted angrily
to the threat of competition. During the first half of the
nineteenth century, many Blacks migrated to urban
centers, either in the custody of masters, as was the case for
Fred Bailey, or after securing their freedom, as happened
with Anna Murray, whom Douglass later married. In
commercial economies like that of Baltimore, slave children
were put to work by their masters in business, commerce,
and craft settings, and worked side-by-side with free Black
children and with whites who had been bound out by their
parents or the poor law authorities. All such children were
at risk, although Black children far more than their white
counterparts, of being abruptly sent away from all things
16. For a discussion of the importance of marriage in establishing rights and
protections for women and children, see Laura F. Edwards, "The Marriage
Covenant is at the Foundationof OurRights". The Politics of Slave Marriagesin
North CarolinaAfter Emancipation,14 L. & HIST. REV. 81 (1996).
17. See MASON, supranote 9, at 7-8, 31-36.
18. See Douglass, supranote 4, at 277, 311-13.
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familiar. Children in slavery and indenture also were
constantly at risk of being demoted from training in service
or skilled crafts, which at least gave some promise of
security even to those who were "slaves for life," and being
assigned menial labor and field hand's work.
In the hierarchy of servitude, apprentices stood at the
top. In theory, the child's consent was required, and he was
entitled to training as part of the bargain. In some
situations, the father of an apprentice, if he cared to assert
his or the child's rights, might turn to the courts to enforce
a master's broken promise to train and educate the child, or
might petition to revoke an illegal assignment of the child
to another master. The typical indenture gave more latitude
for assignments and less assurances of useful education and
training. Racism in both North and South created an
overlay of legal and economic disabilities, placing additional
burdens on free Black children in apprenticeships and
indentures, withdrawing many of the protections afforded
white apprentices, and further blurring the lines between
free and bond labor. A slave child like Fred Bailey was at
the very bottom of the ladder of power. His owner owed no
duty of education or training to him, and was legally as well
as practically free to use, sell, or abuse the child as he
wished, limited primarily by public opinion, which
(according to Douglass) might approve of whipping a child,
but would censure starving her.
Urban children, then as now, posed a special challenge
to adult control. When Fred Bailey tried to assert his will
by learning to read and seeking to learn a trade, he was
deported from Baltimore to his plantation of origin. The
sullen teen lacked proper subservience, so he was rented to
work in the fields under an overseer with a reputation as a
"nigger-breaker.""9 As this episode illustrates, the ability to
transfer a minor child's custody and control from one user
to another provided not only economic benefits, but a means
of maintaining social control of youth. Rebellious youths
could be removed from bad company or temptation and sent
to more restrictive surroundings, where their dangerous
habits might be broken.
Non-slave children also could be sent away by their
parents, and they could be seized by persons charged with
maintaining public order and protecting the young. During
19. Id. at 289.

678

BUFFALO LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 48

the nineteenth century, charities formed to rescue children
from the deviance of youth among the "Dangerous Classes."
Charitable and religious organizations founded houses of
refuge, asylums, and reform schools, committed to
controlling as well as teaching the young. The boundaries
between education, protection, and incarceration were
extremely vague. A child could be detained in these
asylums until age twenty-one against his will, and without
due process of law or any charge of criminal behavior.
Courts rebuffed challenges to children's seizure and
incarceration, by pointing to the educational mission of
these institutions. Parents were warned that, if they failed
to control their children, to feed and clothe them, or to
inculcate them with appropriate morals, the state was
empowered to take over the parental role. Those readers
familiar with Oliver Twist's life in the Poor House would
recognize the following description of a New York asylum:
In summer, they are about fourteen hours under orders daily. On
parade, at table, at their work, and in school, they are not allowed
to converse.... For every trifling commission or omission which it

is deemed wrong to do or to omit to do, they are "cut" with
ratan....

The endurance

of the whip, or the loss

of a

meal-deprivation of play or the solitary cell. On every hand their
walk is bounded; [sic] while
2 Restriction and Constraint are their
most intimate companions. 0

Oddly enough, perhaps because of the traditional
dichotomy of private and public spheres, historians and
scholars studying childhood often seem more concerned
with who is carrying out the beating or incarceration than
with whether children were routinely beaten, imprisoned, or
forced into hard labor. Modern critics point to the abuses of
slavery, or the incarceration of free children, as obvious
deprivations of children's liberties. Less attention has been
paid to the fact that parents and guardians had legal
authority to use the same techniques-whippings,
deprivation of food and education, solitary confinement,
silencing, and forced labor-as legally sanctioned forms of
control.
However, one key fact distinguished free children from
20. CHILDREN AND YOUTH IN AMERICA: A DOCUMENTARY HISTORY 691 (Robert
H. Bremner et al. eds., 1970-74) (quoting ELIJAH DEVOE, THE REFUGE SYSTEM,
OR PRISON DIScIPLiNE APPLIED TO JUVENILE DELINQUENTS 27-28 (1848)).
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slave children-the free child's legal coming of age, which
arrived for boys at twenty-one, and for girls at eighteen or
at marriage. Even here, race and class played a
constraining role. Since children must be in some
responsible adult's custody and control, and Blacks were by
definition irresponsible, laws prohibited the manumission
of slaves until they reached twenty-one, even with their
master's consent. Indentured children were denied
permission to marry, and indentured girls who bore an
illegitimate child would find their terms of service extended
by law. For mulatto children and for white children in long
term indentures, even twenty-one was not a magic number
signaling the end of servitude. Apprenticeships and
indentures lasting past majority were commonplace. Thus
limitations of slavery, involuntary servitude, and
incarceration overlapped in powerfully symbolic ways with
the limitations on the freedom of children as a class. Added
to these, the disabilities and privileges of gender played a
large role in defining and confining nineteenth century
children's lives in slavery and in freedom.
THE DRED SCOTT CASE: UNCOVERING WOMEN'S UNTOLD
STORIES
Recently, a pair of feminist historians named Lea
VanderVelde and Sandhya Subramanian, exploring the
intersections of race and gender, have opened a fascinating
window into one neglected narrative of a woman behind a
famous man-the story of Harriet Robinson Scott. Although
this woman's name is virtually unknown, she is instantly
recognizable when identified as "Mrs. Dred Scott." These
historians skillfully uncovered, hidden between the lines of
the famous case of Dred Scott v. Sandford,2 the story of a
woman's struggle to control her own life and the lives of her
two daughters. 2
In this article, I will open this window a bit further, and
ask you to use your imagination and empathy to capture
the female child's perspective, and to see the case anew
through the eyes of Eliza and Lizzie Scott. Even more
21. Dred Scott v. Sandford, 60 U.S. (19 How.) 393 (1857), superseded, U.S.
CONST. amend. XIII.
22. Lea VanderVelde & Sandhya Subramanian, Mrs. Dred Scott, 106 YALE
L.J. 1033 (1997).
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invisible to history than Mrs. Dred Scott, these two young
girls peek out from between the lines of their famous
father's case. Not only do they provide an insight into their
mother's motivations, and her role in shaping history, they
remind us that the case involved children as well as
adults-two girls who were not only objects of a legal battle,
but persons in their own right.
The Dred Scott case culminated in 1857, in a decision
by the United States Supreme Court which dealt a severe
blow to the abolitionist movement, making Civil War
almost inevitable. The Supreme Court Justices' ruling
concerned a manservant named Dred Scott, but it also
decided the fates of his wife and children, whose cases were
treated as if controlled by and subsumed within his. Dred
Scott had been born in the slave state of Missouri, but had
lived and worked for his owner, Dr. Emerson, and others in
the free state of Illinois, and in Minnesota, a territory
where slavery was prohibited. After he returned to
Missouri, his master died, leaving his human chattels as
part of his estate. Dred Scott brought a lawsuit in a federal
court, claiming he could no longer be treated as a slave
because he had lived in a free territory. 3 The threshold
question for the Supreme Court was a technical matter:
whether persons of African blood and descended from slaves
could invoke the federal courts' "diversity jurisdiction," a
provision of Article III of the Constitution which empowered
the federal courts to hear lawsuits "between Citizens of
different States."' The Supreme Court held that persons of
color were not citizens under Article III, and therefore the
federal courts had erred in hearing Dred Scott's case.2"
Analyzing the prevailing attitude towards the African
race at the time the Constitution was drafted, the Court
observed: "They had for more than a century before been
regarded as beings... so far inferior, that they had no
rights which the white man was bound to respect; and that
the negro might justly and lawfully be reduced to slavery
for his benefit." The Framers who drafted Article III had
also drafted Article I, Section 9, Clause 1 of the
Constitution, which explicitly prohibited Congress from

23.
24.
25.
26.

See Dred Scott, 60 U.S. at 398-99.
U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2; see Dred Scott, 60 U.S. at 403.
See Dred Scott, 60 U.S. at 454.
Id. at 407.
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outlawing the importation of slaves prior to 1808.27 Finally,
in Article IV, Section 2, they had protected slave holders'
rights to recapture their runaway human property across
state lines. 26 Reviewing this history of explicit
discrimination, Chief Justice Taney concluded that it was
not the intention of the Framers of the Constitution in 1789
to include descendants of slaves within the "political
family," and no change of public sentiment in the
intervening years could alter the meaning of the
Constitution.2
Taney did not stop with simply dismissing the case. In a
further discussion, Taney endorsed the concept that
ownership of slaves was not merely an evil tolerated by the
Constitution but a vested property interest protected under
the Constitution." Congress, he concluded, could not
prohibit slavery or importation of slaves into newly
acquired territories of the West because to do so would
deprive slave holders of their property rights in their
slaves.3 ' This reasoning had grave ramifications for the
containment of slavery as well as for the status of African
Americans.
If one assumes, as many scholars and judges still do,
that the Constitution's text should be interpreted according
to the Framer's original intent, judged at the most specific
level of historic fact, Chief Justice Taney and his brethren
may well have been correct. But abolitionists had hoped for
a broader reading of the document, based on its overarching
purpose of advancing human liberty, reinterpreted in the
light of growing sentiment that slavery was fundamentally
incompatible with human liberty.
Among the most powerful advocates for this position
was none other than Frederick Douglass, who had become
an important voice in the abolition movement, and editor of
an abolitionist publication, The North Star. In fact,
Douglass had broken with influential abolitionists like
William Lloyd Garrison over this issue, renaming his
27. U.S. CoNsT. art. I, § 9, cl. 1.
28. See U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 2, cl. 3; supranote 10 and accompanying text.
29. See Dred Scott, 60 U.S. at 417-18, 406-07.
30. See id. at 411.
31. See id. at 450-52. For an in-depth analysis of the various opinions in
Dred Scott v. Sandford, see Mark A. Graber, DesperatelyDucking Slavery: Dred
Scott and Contemporay Constitutional Theory, 14 CONST. COMMENT. 271

(1997).
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publication The Frederick Douglass Papers.While Garrison
believed the Constitution was morally bankrupt and ought
to be discarded, Douglass argued that the document, as a
whole, was intended as a "Glorious Liberty Document." 2
The very same provisions of the Constitution which
recognized slavery also were proof, in Douglass' eyes, of the
Founding Fathers' determination to limit its perpetuation.
He saw these provisions as reflecting the Framers' belief
that the continued toleration of slavery contravened basic
principles of human rights on which the new Republic had
been founded.
The Dred Scott decision, by its rigid and formalistic
interpretation of the text, locked into place the essentialist
racism of an earlier generation, even as this racism was
being most sharply challenged. The decision seemed to close
the door on any process of constitutional evolution short of a
formal amendment. It placed property interests in slaves
above principles of human liberty, and in one stroke
disabled both the courts and Congress from altering the
status quo of slavery. "Perhaps no legal case in American
history is as famous-or as infamous--as Dred Scott v.
Sandford."33
While much attention has been paid to the historic
figure of Dred Scott, little was known of his wife, Harriet, or
her role in the case. Historians VanderVelde and
Subramanian fill that gap in a carefully researched and
detailed account. 4 Their account moves Harriet from the
wings to the center of the stage, and raises conjectures
about the role Harriet must have played both in the genesis
of the case and in determining its outcome. Harriet (they
point out) was active in a church whose pastor was a leader
of the free Blacks in St. Louis. Harriet, in her twenties
when the case was filed, was much younger and stronger
than Dred, a frail man in his fifties who later died of
tuberculosis. She had more to gain from freedom, and her
emancipation would present a far greater monetary loss to
32. Frederick Douglass, What to the Slave is the Fourth of July?, Speech at
a meeting sponsored by the Rochester Ladies' Anti-Slavery Society, Rochester
Hall, Rochester, N.Y. (July 5, 1852), in JAMES MONROE GREGORY, FREDERICK
DOUGLASS THE ORATOR 103-06 (New York, 1907), http://douglass.speech.nwu.
edu/dougal0.htm
33. Paul Finkelman, The Dred Scott Case, Slavery and the Politics of Law,
20 HAMLINE L. REV. 1, 1 (1996).
34. See generally VanderVelde & Subramanian, supra note 22.

2000]

DRED SCOTT'S DAUGHTERS

683

those claiming to own the Scott family members. In terms
of market value, Harriet was clearly the most valuable
asset.
In addition, Harriet's case, differing on both facts and
law from Dred's case, provided stronger grounds for finding
that at least some of the Scott family members had been
emancipated by operation of law. Had Harriet remained in
Pennsylvania, the state of her birth, she would have been
manumitted by law at age twenty-seven. Her removal by
her master to another jurisdiction arguably could not defeat
this statutory right to manumission. The fact that Harriet
and Dred were married at Fort Snelling (in free territory)
by the military officer who was Harriet's master also
supported her claim to freedom. Since slaves were
prohibited from marrying, the officer's act in performing
and making a written record of her civil marriage ceremony
was tantamount to freeing her. Since children's status as
free or slave depended on the status of their mothers at the
time of their birth, Harriet's children were also free.
Despite these plausible arguments for hanging their
case on Harriet's claims to freedom, the abolitionist lawyers
representing the Scotts decided Harriet's claim could be
treated as subsidiary to her husband's, and need not be
argued separately. In historical context, their decision is
not at all surprising. The prevailing doctrine applying to
"free" married women-the law of couverture-placed
married women's property and persons under the power of
their husband. To cast the Scotts' claim in terms of
Harriet's legal rights, rather than Dred's, would have
required a re-visioning not only of race, but also of gender.
Such a shift in consciousness would have been a major feat
even for Harriet's abolitionist attorneys, not to mention the
Supreme Court Justices of 1857, six of whom were slave
holders and none of whom was female. Many abolitionist
sympathizers who thought Scott entitled to be treated as a
citizen would have balked at the notion that their own
wives, let alone a "colored girl" like Harriet, should be
entitled to vote, bring a legal action on her own, sit on a
jury, or hold property in her own right. Even many ardent
abolitionists defended hierarchy within the sphere of the
family as not only natural and normal, but divinely
ordained. Thus, Harriet's subordinate status as a person of
African descent was compounded and complicated by her
status as a woman.
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The strategic decisions of Dred Scott's attorneys provide
a striking example of the complex interactions of racism
and patriarchy in mid-nineteenth century legal thought.
The laws that applied to Harriet as a slave reduced her to
property, but recognized her productivity-both as a worker
and as a child bearer. Albeit for all the wrong reasons, the
antebellum legal system attributed to Harriet the slave a
high economic value, and provided that her children would
inherit their status, as free or slave, from their mother.
Ironically, Harriet's claims to freedom, on which her
daughters' claims depended, were made invisible because
her abolitionist lawyers treated her as Dred Scott's wifedefining her not as a free person, but as the consort of a
man claiming his freedom. Viewed by laws of slavery as a
chattel, she belonged to her owner, and so did her children.
Viewed by her abolitionist champions as a woman, she
belonged to her husband, and so did her children. Because
her attorneys saw her in the culturally and legally ascribed
role of dependent, which described the norm for all "free"
women, they assumed Harriet's case depended on Dred's,
and that the key to her freedom lay in proving that Dred
was a free man. In fact, argue VanderVelde and
Subramanian, the key to Dred Scott's case lay in Harriet's
story.35 If Harriet was free, her children were free.
Moreover, if Harriet was free, then Dred himself was free,
since no man could be both a slave and a "free" woman's
husband. 6 Blinded by their absorption in Dred Scott's claim
to human rights, those who shaped the history of the case
and directed its litigation overlooked Harriet's rights, and
robbed her of "agency"---the power to fimction as an actor,
not just as an object.
ELIZA AND LIZZIE: DISCOVERING DRED AND HARRIET'S

DAUGHTERS

Hidden between the lines of Mrs. Dred Scott's story,
however, there is another story that remains largely
unexplored-that of Eliza and Lizzie. Like Harriet Scott,
35. See id. at 1040-41.
36. Nor could a free Black man legally marry a female slave. One
manumitted slave purchased his "wife" from her master in order to insure that
they could not be separated. Unfortunately, he went bankrupt and his debtors
attached and sold his wife as an article of his property and used the proceeds to
satisfy his debts. See Kyler v. Dunlap, 57 Ky. (18 B. Mon.) 561 (1857).
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Lizzie and Eliza were treated by history as mere
appendages of a famous man. Arguably, the Dred Scott
case, which in some small part precipitated a war and
crystallized conflicting visions of our Constitution, was
driven not by the father's story, but by the elder daughter's
story. It was Eliza Scott's claim of freedom that actually
forced the Supreme Court to decide the issue of the
constitutionality of the Missouri Compromise. While Taney,
as a scholar of conflict of laws, might assert that the
property rights of Dred and Harriet's masters could not be
defeated by their migration from a slave to a free state, it
was clear that Eliza had been born in free territory.
According to the Missouri Compromise, Eliza was free at
birth, and her status depended directly on the application of
federal law. An early twentieth century scholar of slave law,
Helen Catterall, remarks: "Eliza, though born of a slave
mother, was free. Consequently the constitutionality of the
Missouri Compromise act had to be decided in order to
reach a determination of her case." 7 Why has Eliza's case,
so pivotal to the decision, been neglected by history?
Not only was Mrs. Dred Scott deemed to be "one" with
her husband, the Scott girls' identity has also been
subsumed in that of their father. This concentration in the
head of the household of power over both women and
children is illustrated by the theory behind the claim which
Dred Scott's lawyers used to gain access to the federal
courts. In 1853, in his bid to be recognized as a "citizen" of
Missouri for purposes of federal diversity jurisdiction, Dred
Scott filed a claim "in trespass" alleging that John F.A.
Sanford, a citizen of New York, had assaulted himself, his
wife, and his daughters. He asked $3000 damages for the
assault against himself, plus $2500 for loss of the services,
comfort, and society of Harriet, his wife, and $2500 for the
loss of services, comfort, and society of Eliza and Lizzie,
"then and still infant daughters and servants of the
plaintiff ....38
37. 5

JUDICIAL CASES CONCERNING AMERICAN SLAVERY AND THE NEGRO

121

(Helen Tunnicliff Catterall ed., 1968) (internal footnotes omitted) [hereinafter
JUDICIAL CASES VOL. 5].
38. DRED SCOTT, PL[AINTIFF] IN ER[ROR]. V. JOHN F. A. SANDFORD. IN ERROR
TO THE CIRCUIT COURT U.S. FOR THE DISTRICT OF MISSOURI, reprinted in 3
SOUTHERN SLAVES IN FREE STATE COURTS: THE PAMPHLET LITERATURE 3-4
(Slavery Race and the American Legal System 1700-1872: A Sixteen Volume
Facsimile Series Reproducing Over One Hundred and Seventy Rare and
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Some historical background is necessary to understand
Dred Scott's claim. Recall that Dred Scott and his family
were property of a Dr. Emerson. At Dr. Emerson's death, he
left a life estate in his property to Mrs. Emerson, with the
remainder for his daughters. The widow's brother, John
Sanford, became executor of the estate when his sister
remarried, since her remarriage disqualified her as
executor.39 Apparently enraged by the Scotts' state court
lawsuit to gain their freedom, on January 1, 1853, Sanford
had accosted the Scotts at the place where they were
working, accused them of being "worthless and insolent,"
whipped them viciously, locked them in a barn, and then
proceeded to whip their young daughters." These acts
provided the basis for Dred Scott's claim of trespass, and
the fact that Dred Scott was claiming Missouri citizenship,
and Sanford was a New York citizen, provided the factual
predicate for federal diversity jurisdiction. Sanford's
defense was twofold: first, that the federal court lacked
jurisdiction because Dred Scott was not a citizen at all; and
second, that the blows had been inflicted in the course of
instruction in obedience, a perfectly legal act when done by
a master or master's surrogate to a slave.
As we have seen, the same theory-the patriarch's right
to administer physical correction to maintain control of
household members-would have provided a defense to any
husband and father charged with beating his wife and
children. The rights of a "freeman" bore disturbing
similarities to the rights of masters over their slaves. The
power to control one's subordinate family members
appeared as a core element in defining the rights of free
"men," and contradicted basic principles of self ownership
for women and children.
Given the vulnerability of slave children to sudden
dislocation, it is not surprising that the historians who
focused the spotlight on Mrs. Dred Scott treat concerns
about her two daughters as important elements in the
likely formation by their mother of a strategy to keep the
family together. But because of their status as children, the
Important Pamphlets, Series I, Paul Finkelman ed. 1988) [hereinafter
SOUTHERN SLAVES]; see also VINCENT C. HOPKINS, DRED SCOTT'S CASE 23-25
(1967).
39. See HOPKINS, supra note 38, at 23 n.3. The Supreme Court documents
apparently spelled his name with an extra "d" as "Sandford." Id.
40. CHARLES MoRRow WILSON, THE DRED SCOTT DECISION 21-22 (1973).
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daughters appear as passive objects of concern rather than
as actors in their own right. They seem deprived of agency
and individual identity even in VanderVelde and
Subramanian's skillful retelling of Mrs. Dred Scott's story.
All sources, however, appear to agree that Eliza was
born north of the Missouri state line, "indisputably in free
territory," a fact that ought to have given added force to her
claim of freedom.4 ' Although the records of the second
daughter's age are more confused, it seems most likely that
Lizzie was about a year or so younger than her sister.'
Using the probable dates of their births as a template, we
can imagine that Eliza was eight and Lizzie about seven
when Dred Scott and Harriet Scott filed their first state
court case in 1846. The girls were sixteen and fifteen at the
time of the federal case filing in 1853, and young women of
nineteen and eighteen when the Supreme Court handed
down its opinion deciding their parents' case in 1857.
Undoubtedly, this case must have dominated the sisters'
childhood, framing their understanding of their own status
and prospects in life, much as Master Hugh's diatribe on
the evils of teaching slaves to read had framed the issue of
"slavery for life" for eight year old Fred Bailey."
As girls, Dred Scott's daughters occupied a status both
like and unlike Fred Bailey's. Protected by loving parents,
yet subject to different constraints and forms of exploitation
because of their gender, these girls inhabited a very
different urban landscape. To imagine the impact of
minority, gender, and slavery on these two young girls, one
must try to imagine being young, Black, and female in St.
Louis, Missouri, not today-a time when childhood for girls
41. E.g., DON E. FEHRENBACHER, SLAVERY, LAW, AND POLITIcs: THE DRED
SCOTT CASE IN HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE 125 (1981) (discussing passages from
the autobiography of fellow passenger, Reverend Alfred Brunson).
42. As with many of the facts in the Dred Scott case, inconsistencies exist
between the historical record and reports or recitations in the court records. The
trial judge in the federal case, tried in 1854, apparently instructed the jury that
Eliza was about fourteen but she may have been as old as sixteen. Compare THE
CASE OF DRED SCOTT IN THE UNITED STATES SUPREME COURT: THE FULL OPINIONS
OF CHIEF JUSTICE TANEY AND JUSTICE CURTIS, AND ABSTRACTS OF THE OPINIONS
OF THE OTHER OPINIONS OF THE OTHER JUDGES 3-4 (Horace Greeley & Co. 1860),
reprinted in SOUTHERN SLAVES, supra note 38, at 179, with VanderVelde &
Subramanian, supra note 22, at 1042 n.27 (indicating that Eliza's most
probable year of birth was 1838, and noting that one historian estimates that,
in 1857, Eliza was nineteen years old and Lizzie was eighteen).
43. See supra notes 5-7 and accompanying text.
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of color in urban America is tough enough-but between
1846 and 1857. Simply because they were females, their
experience in St. Louis was hardly likely to have been the
liberating experience that the slave child Fred Bailey found
in Baltimore." A boy (even a slave like Fred) might be
apprenticed to learn a trade. A girl was destined to do
laundry, cleaning, and cooking-then as now, menial tasks.
Physical abuse was a constant for girls as well as boys.
When Fred was fifteen, as I have noted, he was sent to a
plantation to be taught his place with the lash. 45 Eliza was
fifteen when Sanford seized her father and mother, and
whipped them. The coup de grace in Sanford's exercise of
dominion, however, was his "spanking" of Dred's daughters,
a "collective indignity" designed to show their father his
subservient place.
One cruel aspect of patriarchy, especially when
compounded by racial or ethnic hatred, is the notion that a
man can be humiliated by abusing his human possessions,
his wife and children, especially his "innocent" daughters.
In slavery, as in war, girls such as Eliza and Lizzie could
expect to be used as object lessons for males, and their
subservience enforced not only by physical assault, but by
sexual assault. Had Eliza and Lizzie been sold down-river,
their sexuality would have been included in their economic
value, which treated every form of the slave women's labor
including childbirth, as an asset of the master. Subject to
being abused by white men, "bred" to Black men not of their
own choosing, unable to nurse or keep the babies to whom
they had given birth, and prohibited from legal marriage or
divorce, females in slavery experienced a different and even
more profound form of oppression than males. Of all
females, young girls were most vulnerable. As VanderVelde
and Subramanian point out, surely Harriet knew the
dangers of separating from her daughters and feared for
their futures.4
Historians have questioned why Dred and Harriet Scott
did not flee north when they were in free territory, or
conversely, why they did not bring their suit earlier.
VanderVelde and Subramanian's re-examination of the
44.
45.
46.
47.

See supranote 18 and accompanying text.
See supranote 19 and accompanying text.
HOPKINS, supra note 38, at 23.
VanderVelde & Subramanian, supra note 22, at 1075-76.
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Scott's history, from Harriet's perspective, highlights the
value Harriet would have placed on keeping the family
together.48 Flight was an especially risky option for a family,
as opposed to a single male. Many escapes were foiled, and
families ripped apart, by the difficulty of bringing a band
including children and women to safety.49 For many years,
the status quo must have seemed preferable to flight.
Even when pressed, court action may have seemed a
safer route than becoming a fugitive. Harriet's suit was the
first to be filed. It seems likely that the timing of her suit
was prompted by fear that Emerson's widow intended to
sell her human chattels, as she had sold other portions of
her husband's estate. An estate sale raised dramatically the
likelihood that the Scott family members would be
separated, and sold to different owners. You will recall that
Fred Bailey was taken from his grandmother's home at age
six, and shipped to Baltimore to work as a house servant at
age eight." Eliza and Lizzie, at eight and seven, were
reaching the stage at which slave children were put to
work, raising the specter that the girls might be sold away
from their mother, perhaps to a trader traveling to the
cotton and sugar plantations of Mississippi and Louisiana.
From a mother's perspective, there was much to fear. What
about the child's perspective? How much of this context did
the girls understand, and how did it shape their childhood
and girlhood? Eliza and Lizzie had lived a relatively secure
life in St. Louis, but surely, as they grew older and more
savvy in reading between the lines of adults' conversations,
they began to understand the ominous uncertainty of their
futures.
Fear of losing Eliza and Lizzie must have loomed large
not only for their parents, but for their owner. It is unclear
whether they were hired out by day as servants, but if they
were, they might have brought home considerable wages.
Sold at auction, a healthy adolescent girl would command
over three hundred dollars.' But who owned these girls and
48. See id. at 1062, 1074-77.
49. See Deborah Gray White, Female Slaves in the Plantation South, in
BEFORE FREEDOM CAME: AFRIcAN-AMERIcAN LIFE IN THE ANTEBELLUM SOUTH

101, 106-07 (Edward D.C. Campbell, Jr. & Kym S. Rice eds., 1991).
50. See supranote 13 and accompanying text.
51. VanderVelde & Subramanian, supra note 22, at 1063 n.126 (estimating
the value of the Scott family members using statistics compiled in 1914 by
Harrison Anthony Trexler) (citing HARRISON ANTHONY TREXLER, SLAvERY IN
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their labor? Here again we see how the essentials of
"freedom" are strangely contextual and can vary depending
on one's status and one's perspective. In helping the Scott
family members gain their freedom, it is unlikely that the
Scott's volunteer attorneys, Harriet's free Black minister, or
Dred's sympathetic white supporters thought to question
the notion that one of Dred Scott's "rights" as a free man
would be the right to collect his daughters' wages.
Well into the twentieth century, a father's vested rights
in a child's wages were a recognized economic asset. 2 This
asset was gender-linked in more ways than one. Fathers,
not mothers, owned a child's wages. The 1872 Kentucky
case of Allen v. Allen illustrates the common law exception
that proved the rule. A Black woman who had born a child
while in slavery won her lawsuit against the child's father,
also a former slave, on appeal due to a technicality. After
emancipation, the father had left the mother, taking the
child with him. Instead of contracting a valid marriage with
his child's mother, he had married another woman, and had
hired out the child of the earlier relationship, collecting her
wages. The mother prevailed in recovering the wages,
although not the child, by arguing that, since slave
marriages were illegal when the child was born, the boy
was a bastard, and therefore his wages belonged not to the
father, but to the mother.53
Clearly, one of the valuable "rights" gained when slave
parents were emancipated was the right to claim the labor
value of one's own child. In the backlash following
Reconstruction, this right was trampled by the Black Codes,
which empowered agents to bind Black children in
indentures and apprenticeships to former slave holders
based on the natural parents' supposed inability to support
or properly raise them. Thus children's minority, and the
power it created in the State to control their movement and
training, was used to re-enslave Black children even after
their parents had been emancipated.54
MissouRi 1804-1865, at 38-39 (1914)).
52. See Barbara Bennett Woodhouse, "Who Owns the Child?":"Meyer and
Pierce and the Child as Property, 33 WM. & MARY. L. REV. 995, 1064 (1992).
53. See Allen v. Allen, 8 Bush 490 (Ky. 1872), reported in 1 JUDICIAL CASES
CONCERNING AMERICAN SLAVERY AND THE NEGRO 467 (Helen Tunnicliff Catterall

ed., 1968) [hereinafter JUDICIAL CASES VOL. 1].
54. See PEGGY COOPER DAVIS, NEGLECTED STORIES: THE CONSTITUTION AND

FAMLYVALUES 152-53 (1997).
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Gender, in tandem with minority, made a large
difference in the Black child's labor prospects and paths to
freedom. Fred Bailey, being a male, was able to negotiate a
de facto emancipation from his master. He became an
independent young man living on his own by agreeing to
support himself and pay his master a bounty over and
above his market as the price of being permitted to function
as an independent entrepreneur. "Free" boys apparently
made similar bargains with their fathers. Consider, in
contrast, the experience of Fred's grandmother, Betsy
Bailey. Fred inherited his entrepreneurial spirit from
Betsy, who managed to devise a way of living
independently. She won permission to "marry" a free Black
man and her garden and household were her own. While
Betsy's husband assumed responsibility for her
maintenance, he could not give her or her children their
liberty. Her child-bearing and child-rearing labor as mother
and grandmother still belonged to her white owner, and she
was expected to nurse her children and grandchildren
through helpless infancy until they were old enough to be of
value to their legal owner.55
In addition, where Fred Bailey saw ships sailing north
up the coast towards New England, and freedom," Eliza
and Lizzie were more likely to see Mississippi side-wheelers
carrying slave traders' coffies down-river toward the
plantations of the deep South. Free soil was tantalizingly
close for Eliza and Lizzie-but unattainable. Just across the
river, in East St. Louis, was the free state of Illinois. But
rarely was a Black girl able to negotiate the distance
between St. Louis, Missouri, and the free side of the river.
For boys, the cases on fugitive slaves show that river
boats were a prime vehicle for making an escape. A slave
boy named Lewis, worth $900, was hired out to work on a
river boat as a fireman. He escaped when the boat docked
at Cincinnati, Ohio.5" Remarked the court, in finding for the
defendant steamboat captain, "it is not the custom for boats
hiring slaves on board to iron them or confine them when
they enter a free port. If that should become common, the
55. For a comprehensive history of the childhood and youth of Frederick
Douglass, see WIbLLi S. MCFEELY, FREDERICK DOUGLASS (1991).
56. See supranote 8 and accompanying text.
57. Meekin v. Thomas, 17 B. Mon. 710 (Ky. 1857), reported in JuDICIAL
CASES VOL. 1, supra note 53, at 428-29.
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practice of hiring slaves on steamboats would be at an
end." 58 Masters were warned that a slave hired as a boat
hand would find many opportunities to escape, yet they
continued with this lucrative practice: 9
Where a slave is hired as a boat hand, we must presume that the
owner is fully aware, that every facility for escape is afforded by
the very nature of the service. He is apprised, that the boat will
touch and be detained at the wharves of populous towns; that it
passes near the banks, and will stop at the landings of States
where slavery is not tolerated; and that his slave will be associated
with free negroes, and others who will not be likely to leave him
ignorant of the various opportunities which present themselves for
escape. The owner is aware of all this, and must be presumed to
contract with reference to it. He insures his slave, or indemnifies
himself for the increased risk by the increased wages.

While the economic value of clever boys was best exploited
by giving them greater liberty, that of girls was exploited by
keeping them close to home.
Adolescent girls were a particularly closely-guarded
commodity because of their future reproductive value. Even
an enlightened and progressive slave holder would be
loathe to free a girl of fifteen or sixteen, just entering her
reproductive years. Many reported cases show how girls
were promised freedom, but only after they had passed
their child-bearing years or produced a certain number of
offspring for the master's benefit. For example, Catherine
Bodine's will set her slave Jenny free "whenever she should
cease child-bearing,""' and Kitty's benevolent master Mr.
Winston promised her freedom in twelve years, but
meanwhile sold her for $150 to a Mr. Chambers, "to have
and to hold said girl Kitty for the term aforesaid, and her
increase during said term absolutely and forever." 2 One
enlightened Kentuckian provided by will that his slave
58. Id. at 429.
59. See Perry v. Beardslee, 10 Mo. 568 (1847), reported in JUDICIAL CASES
VOL. 5, supranote 37, at 172.
60. Id.
61. Catherine Bodine's Will, 4 Dana 476 (Ky. 1836), reported in JUDICIAL
CASES VOL. 1, supra note 53, at 334.
62. Kitty v. Commonwealth, 18 B. Mon. 522 (Ky. 1857), reported in JUDICIAL
CASES VOL. 1, supra note 53, at 429; see also Lee v. Sprague, 14 Mo. 476 (1851),
reported in JUDICIAL CASES VOL. 5, supra note 37, at 183 (holding that children

born to female slaves before their "time of service expired" are not automatically
entitled to freedom).
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Hannah should be free after reaching age thirty-one, and
stipulated that all the children she might have before
reaching thirty-one should be slaves until they reached age
twenty-five, "and their increase to the latest generation, are
to be and remain slaves until they shall respectively arrive
to the full age of twenty-five years."" Sadly, the rule against
perpetuities defeated even this small measure of qualified
future freedom for Hannah's children and grandchildren.
Even in narratives of slavery, the least chivalrous of
institutions, the notion that a girl needs a male protector
forms a recurrent theme, sometimes appearing as a
restraint on her ability to flee, and sometimes as a threat to
coerce her into sexual compliance. In a telling passage of
Incidents in the Life of a Slave Girl,64 yet another HarrietHarriet Jacobs, writing under the pseudonym of Linda
Brent-describes a period in her adolescence when she was
tormented by the unwanted sexual attentions of her
master. She recalls planning with her younger brother
William how they would someday escape to the free states.
One major impediment was the opposition of her
grandmother, a woman who, like Fred's grandmother, had a
home of her own-and nursed the hope of earning enough
money through baking cakes not only to raise her offspring,
but to eventually buy them. Here is how Harriet describes
the tension between her own youthful passion for freedom
and her grandmother's mature fears:
As for grandmother, she was strongly opposed to her children's
undertaking any such project. She had not forgotten poor
Benjamin's sufferings, and she was afraid that if another child
tried to escape, he would have a similar or a worse fate. To me,
nothing seemed more dreadful than my present life. I said to
myself, "William must be free. He shall go to the north, and I will
follow him." Many a slave sister has formed the same plans.

The modern reader is struck by the contrast between the
girl's spirited resolve and her assumption that freedom was
for men. She could not think of her own escape until a
fourteen-year-old boy, two years her junior, had gone ahead.
63. Ludwig (of color) v. Combs, 1 Met. 128 (Ky. 1858), reported in JUDICIAL
CASES VOL. 1, supranote 53, at 435.
64. HARRiET A. JACOBS, INCIDENTS IN THE LIFE OF A SLAVE GIRL (L. Maria

Child ed., 1861), in THE CLASSIc SLAVE NARRATiVES, supra note 4, at 341.
65. Id. at 374.
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Like Harriet Scott, Harriet Jacobs was constrained by both
her race and her gender. While some narratives of girls in
slavery reflect vulnerability and dependency, the stories of
others like Sojourner Truth and Harriet Tubman run
counter to such "feminine" images. These females were
often depicted, even by their friends within the abolition
movement, as oddities, noble savages, or exotic Amazons.
By their enemies, they were depicted as de-sexed Aunt
Jemimas or over-sexed Jezebels. 6 All girls, but especially
colored girls, were caught between the stereotypes that
defined the sexes in dichotomous stereotypes: strong or
helpless; powerful or fragile; and chaste or promiscuous. As
female children and adolescent girls, Eliza and Lizzie were
situated at a very complex time and place made
extraordinarily dangerous by the confluence of race, gender,
and minority.
What were their beliefs and behaviors, confronted with
the facts of slavery and emancipation? How did they act to
"make their own world?" Were these girls passive objects or
did they possess some "agency" of their own? There are
hints in the meager historical record that Eliza and Lizzie
may have shown more independence and power than
conventional images of girlhood would have allowed them.
Contemporary reports noted that the girls had "run away"
while the case was pending. We do not know whether they
planned their escape with or without the blessing of their
parents. Young people and their parents do not always
place the same priorities on personal freedom and family
unity. Just as we must struggle to recognize Harriet Scott
as an individual with agency, we must do the same for her
teen-aged daughters. The narratives of slavery indicate
that children began to understand that they were slaves
around the age of six or seven, that slavery was a topic of
intense discussion with other children during pre66. See ELIzABETH Fox-GENOVESE, WITHIN THE PLANTATION HOUSEHOLD:
BLACK AND WHITE WOMEN OF THE OLD SOUTH 290-292 (1988); BELL HOOKS, AIN'T
I A WOMAN: BLACK WOMEN AND FEMINISM (1981); Regina Austin, Sapphire
Bound!, 1989 WIS. L. REv. 539 (1989); Nancy Ehrenreich, The Colonization of
the Womb, 43 DUKE L.J. 492 (1993); Cheryl I. Harris, Finding Sojourner's
Truth: Race, Gender, and the Institution of Property, 18 CARDoZo L. REV. 309
(1996); Paula C. Johnson, At the Intersection of Injustice:Experiences ofAfrican
American Women in Crime and Sentencing, 4 AM. U. J. GENDER & L. 1 (1995);
Joan R. Tarpley, Black Women, Sexual Myth, and Jurisprudence,69 TEMPLE L.
REV. 1343 (1996).
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adolescent years, and, by early adolescence, many were
already plotting their escapes. Many a slave, male and
female, ran away while still legally a child, leaving a father,
mother, or grandmother behind who could not or would not
leave.'
The Scott girls did not return to their parents' home
until they were no longer slaves, and no longer minors. In
May of 1857, two months after the Supreme Court decision
was announced, in a move that surprised many observers
and still baffles historians, Dred Scott and his family were
manumitted by their owner. Newspapers covering this
development reported that Dred's daughters "Were,
virtually, free before, having achieved their freedom by
their heels what the more conscientious Dred could not
secure by ten years of litigation. Their whereabouts have
been kept a secret." The reporter speculated, perhaps
reflecting stereotypes about paternal omnipotence, that
"[tiheir father knew where they were, and could bring them
' 8
back at any moment. He will doubtless recall them now. 6
The Scotts were free at last, but the Dred Scott decision
would live on as legal precedent until overruled by the
passage of the Fourteenth Amendment in 1868. Dred Scott
v. Sandford brought joy to the slave holders but was
roundly condemned by abolitionists, including an aspiring
politician named Abraham Lincoln. On June 26, 1857,
Lincoln delivered a speech attacking the decision which had
been defended by his opponent Judge Douglas. Lincoln
clearly understood the incalculable value of legal
personhood to Black girls like Eliza and Lizzie. Pointing to
their special vulnerability, he ridiculed the claim made by
Judge Douglas that upholding slavery would prevent
mixing of the races:
The very Dred Scott case affords a strong test as to which party
most favors amalgamation, the Republicans or the dear Unionsaving Democracy. Dred Scott, his wife, and two daughters were
all involved in the suit. We desired the court to have held that they
were citizens so far at least as to entitle them to a hearing as to

67. See, e.g., JACOBS, supra note 64, at 374 (describing the pain that Harriet

Jacobs, assuming the pseudonym Linda Brent, and other youthful family
members felt in going against the pleas of a beloved grandmother who opposed
their flight from slavery).
68. VanderVelde & Subramanian, supra note 22, at 1074 (quoting Dred
Scott Free at Last, supranote 1).
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whether they were free or not; and then, also, that they were in
fact and in law really free. Could we have had our way, the
chances of these black girls ever mixing their blood with that of
white people would have been diminished at least to the extent
that it could not have been without their consent. But Judge
Douglas is delighted to have them decided to be slaves, and not
human enough to have a hearing, even if they were free, and thus
left subject to the forced concubinage of their masters, and liable to
become mothers of mulattos in spite of themselves ....69

By 1858, the girls had returned to their parents' home. °
Dred Scott died in 1858, and apparently Harriet and Eliza
died shortly thereafter, most likely of tuberculosis, the
great equalizer which had also claimed their and his
master, Dr. Emerson. Lizzie reappears briefly as a figure in
the commemorative events surrounding the 100th
anniversary of Dred Scott's birth, and then disappears for
good. Unlike Frederick Douglass, neither of the Scott girls
left us a narrative of her childhood, so we can only imagine
what these girls thought of the case that made their father's
name famous. We do know, however, from the narratives of
girls like Harriet Jacobs that slavery held uniquely
different terrors for girls than for boys, and we know that
their gender circumscribed their avenues of escape. As
Henry Louis Gates, Jr. says of Incidents in the Life of a
Slave Girl, "Jacobs[U ... charts vivid detail by vivid detail

precisely how the shape of her life and the choices she
makes are defined by her reduction as a sexual object, an
object to be raped, bred, or abused."'1 We also know that
many slave girls, in spite of or because of this specter, did
"take to their heels" at great peril to themselves, and
against the wishes of parents who feared losing their child
to the unknown more than they feared the known evils of
slavery.
BLACK URBAN GIRLS AND THE FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT

What does it matter today that the traditional story of
Dred Scott v. Sandford treats Lizzie and Eliza as
69. Abraham Lincoln, Address in Springfield, Illinois on the Dred Scott
Decision, (June 26, 1857), reprinted in FAMOuS SPEECHES: ABRAHAM LINCOLN

30-31 (Peter Pauper Press 1935).
70. FEHRENBACHER, supranote 41, at 295.
71. THE CLASSIC SLAvE NARRATIVES, supranote 4, at xvii.
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nonentities? Their very anonymity confirms how often one
must search the historical record in vain for evidence of the
experiences of children who participated in history, both by
living it and by shaping it. Especially likely to be overlooked
or misunderstood are the experiences of those children
caught in a complex matrix of overlapping categories-race,
sex, class, and minority-which together combine to distort
their stories and render them "unimportant" and
"marginal."
The stories of these girls, and of their mother and
father, also illustrate the mutually reinforcing qualities of
race, sex, and age which generate cultural stereotypes and
laws based on these generalizations. As we can see, these
elements combine and re-combine in complex formulae that
unjustly empower or disempower classes of persons,
without regard to individual qualities and merits. Such
stereotypes seem to have a symbiotic relationship, each
feeding on and nourishing the others. As Professor Dorothy
Roberts has observed, "[rlacism makes the experience of
sexism different for Black women and white women. But it
is not enough to note that Black women suffer from both
racism and sexism, although this is true. Racism is
patriarchal. Patriarchy is racist. We will
72 not destroy one
institution without destroying the other."
The same can be said of the interlocking disabilities
experienced by girls like Lizzie and Eliza. The experiences
of Lizzie and Eliza were not the same as the experiences of
boys like Fred Bailey or grown women like Harriet Scott.
However, the cultural and legal images of women, children,
and people of color as naturally subordinate beings lacking
in rational capacity were rooted in the same fertile soil of
inequality. Discrimination against children seemed to
thrive in symbiotic relationship with discrimination against
Blacks, the poor, and females. A challenge to injustice
towards any of these groups tends to expose the
interconnections among them.
In the words of one scholar studying the intersections of
race and gender, "[silavery was the architect of prevailing
stereotypes of Black women, but equally, it was the source
of sexual and racial ideologies that determined the roles of

72. Dorothy E. Roberts, Racism and Patriarchy in the Meaning of
Motherhood, 1 AM. U. J. GENDER & L. 1, 3 (1993).

698

BUFFALOLAW REVIEW

[Vol. 48

men, both white and Black, and of white women."73
Ideologies of citizenship and freedom clashed with
ideologies of gender inequality and racial inferiority, and
combined in strange and ambiguous ways to perpetuate old
injustices. In one Reconstruction Era case, an emancipated
slave was indicted for beating his wife-a highly unlikely
outcome had the husband and wife been white. Legal
historian Reva Siegel notes the inherent ambivalence of
this case: "Was it to ensure that the woman was not treated
like a 'slave,' or to prevent her recently emancipated
husband from asserting the 'privileges' of a master?"74 I
would add another dimension to this relational matrix by
calling attention to the ways in which stereotypes about
race and gender drew upon stereotypes of childhood and
youth, and, in turn, reinforced those disabling stereotypes.
The mythology that branded women and slaves as children
tended not only to infantilize women and justify slavery,
but also to reinforce the essentialist myth of children's
incapacity as a class. Children, women, and slaves were by
nature "childish" and lacking rational capacity, "naughty"
and needing physical correction, "innocent" and needing to
be sheltered from reality, "indolent" and needing to be
caned and whipped at school or in the home, "primitive"
and unfit for adult society, and "fibbers" or "fantasizers"
and not to be trusted to tell the truth or accurately report
events they witnessed. Such generalizations, while having
some basis in children's reality, were used to justify laws
which disabled all children as a class, allowing them to be
exploited, abused, and silenced with impunity.
Because historically children have been silenced by
convention-seen but not heard-we must try especially
hard to uncover their hidden and neglected stories. Many
children are not free to tell their stories until adulthood,
and very young children often cannot tell their own stories
and must depend on adults to do so.
There is always a danger, however, in one group's
taking up arms in self-appointed defense of another.
Modern African American scholars such as bell hooks and
Cheryl I. Harris have highlighted the history of
73. Cheryl I. Harris, supra note 2, at 388.
74. Reva B. Siegel, "The Rule of Love"." Wife Beating as Prerogative and
Privacy, 105 YALE L. J. 2117, 2135 (1996) (discussing Fulgham v. State, 46 Ala.
143 (1871)).
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appropriation by white feminists of Black women's stories

of slavery in order to lend rhetorical power to their own
struggle for equal rights.75 Similar dangers accompany the
use of children's stories of slavery to lend rhetorical power
to the notion that all children historically were held in
bondage. There is a fine line between drawing analogies to
such stories to make more visible the reality of children's
oppression as a class, and seeming to suggest that children
in slavery experienced nothing very different from children
in general. This would be patently untrue. But, as Harris
points out, the solution is not to ignore or deny the
existence of stories of oppression, or prohibit others from
hearing them, but rather to "attend more closely to [such
voices] as a gateway to exploring the relational matrix
between race, gender, and property forged in slavery .... ",
Similarly, we need to hear the voices of these children as
clearly as we can, enabling these young protagonists to
speak with as much authenticity (even in translation) as is
humanly possible. The cautious note struck by critics such
as hooks and Harris tells us to be wary of the risk to
children in having others tell their stories, but not to turn a
deaf ear.
Male abolitionists appropriated the narratives of
women and children by simply folding dominance over
women and children into the definition of a free man's
rights. White women suffragists and feminists appropriated
the stories of women and girls of color by assuming that
their own experiences of subordination were equivalent to
their Black sisters' experiences of chattel slavery. They too
often played upon stereotypes of Blacks instead of allowing
Black women their own voices. Early feminists
appropriated children's stories to make their case for
gender equality, and used the disabling power of
domesticity to create an intimate realm in which childrenespecially female children-played the role of cherished but
compliant subjects.
We see this same phenomenon of misappropriation in
abolitionist rhetoric. A recurring theme in the literature
about slavery is the claim that slavery deprived parents of
their rights of custody and control over their children, and
gave other adults dominion over their offspring. While
75. Cheryl I. Harris, supra note 2; HOOKS, supra note 66.
76. Cheryl I. Harris, supra note 2, at 392.

700

BUFFALOLAW REVIEW

[Vol. 48

adults experienced this deprivation as a painful limit on
their abilities to protect their children from harm, they also
saw it as a deep personal injustice, robbing them of their
rights. Children, however, may have experienced the same
events differently, as a form of terror and confusion that left
them not knowing where they belonged and whom they
ought to love, fear, and obey. Here is a passage describing
the plight of William, Linda Trent's younger brother:
One day, when his father and his mistress both happened to call
him at the same time, he hesitated between the two; being
perplexed to know which had the strongest claim upon his
obedience. He finally concluded to go to his mistress. When my
father reproved him for it, he said, "You both called me, and I

didn't know which I ought to go to first."
'You are my child," replied our father, "and when I call you, you
should 7come immediately, if you have to pass through fire and
water."7

Viewed from a parent's perspective, this vignette
illustrates the valiant attempt to keep a sense of family
structure intact despite the destructive laws of slavery.
Certainly, the parent acted to assert the child's dignity as
much as he acted to assert his own by showing William that
he must never let his identity be defined as chattel, rather
than son. William's father acted as he should have under
the circumstances forced upon him. Yet this should not
overshadow the possibly different meaning of this story for
the child. William experienced the evil of slavery in a way
that was unique-small and dependent on others, he was
torn between two "masters," each attempting to command
his obedience and define his identity. This is a story of a
parent asserting his rights; it is also a story about a child
caught in the struggle for dominance.
The neglected stories of families in slavery, as Peggy
Cooper Davis suggests, provide an interpretive tool that
gives meaning and dimension to concepts like equality, due
process, and human dignity. 8 These values, which are the
antithesis of slavery, were made a part of our Constitution
in response to the evils of slavery. What we condemned as a
society in rejecting slavery is the converse and foil to the
77. JACOBS, supra note 64, at 345.
78. See DAVIS, supra note 54, at 226.
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positive values reflected in the Civil War Amendments. 9
These interpretational tools must be used to explore the
meaning of "liberty" for children as well as adults, so that
the evils that formed children's experiences of slavery will
not be perpetuated.
Contemporary scholars look to the experiences of
nineteenth century children and see many troubling
similarities with today's children. Today, 600,000 children,
a disproportionate number of them children of color, live in
foster care as wards of the state. The legal status of
children remains problematic. Even in cases involving
termination of their family ties, they often lack standing or
party status. Whether wards of the state or captives in
abusive homes, too many children remain at the mercy of
unloving adults who claim absolute ownership. Such
children are at risk of physical and sexual abuse, deprived
of the opportunity to grow physically and intellectually, and
subject to being torn arbitrarily from familiar surroundings
and people. Teenagers are still being reprogrammedsummarily shipped off to strangers, some of them trained
as spirit-breakers, without due process of law. Children
caught in custody battles and contested adoptions are in
constant confusion about where their loyalties lie and the
identity of their "real" parents. Too often, they are treated
as objects rather than persons. These continuing injustices
toward children, whether perpetrated by the state or by the
parent under color of state law, evoke the stories of children
in slavery. The stories I have told of girls (and boys) at the
intersections of race and patriarchy should make us wary
when denial of due process to children and children's
subjugation are defended as a "liberty" conferred on adults
by the Civil War Amendments.

79. See U.S. CONST. amends. XIII-XV.

